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NāGāRjuNA’S CoNCEPT of EMPTiNESS iN  




One of the most difficult and controversial concepts in 
Buddhism is the concept of emptiness or śūnyatā. It often 
attracts the attention of Western thinkers, who expend 
much effort either to embrace or reject it. Hence, this 
concept had led to many contradictory interpretations 
and endless discussions. Emptiness, or śūnyatā, has been 
so often misunderstood, not only in the West, but also in 
India itself, even during Nāgārjuna’s own time. Out of this 
bed of conflicting interpretations lies the motivation for 
this article to assist in the understanding of the concept of 
śūnyatā. I will focus on the concept as taught by the Indian 
monk Nāgārjuna of the Mādhyamika school. In pursuing 
this approach, I will show a corresponding interpretation 
of another Mādhyamika monk, Śāntideva, and will reveal 
parallels to the 19th century German philosopher Arthur 
Schopenhauer. In order to demonstrate an opposing theory, 
I will contrast Nāgārjuna’s concept to the theory of the 
ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle.
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Introducing Nāgārjuna
The tradition is that Nāgārjuna founded together with his disciple 
Āryadeva the Mādhyamika school, a darśana, which is famous for 
its systematic approach to help seeing things the way they really are. 
Mādhyamika is an important school in the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition. 
Its name derives from its middle position between the realism of the 
Sarvāstivāda, the doctrine that all is real and the idealism of the Yogācāra, 
or that all is only mind. Hence, Paul Williams translates Mādhyamika 
as the ‘Middling’ or the ‘Middle Way’.1 The school’s clarification of the 
concept śūnyatā is regarded as an intellectual and spiritual achievement of 
the highest order. This led to the recognition of Nāgārjuna as a patriarch 
by several later Buddhist schools.
There have been many hagiographies written of Nāgārjuna; some 
even refer to him as the “second Buddha”.2 Various sources describe 
Nāgārjuna in glamorous ways. The Encyclopædia Britannica article tries 
to sift fact from fiction:
“The fact that various texts ascribe different religious 
qualities to Nāgārjuna and give dates for his life that range 
over 500 years suggests that the references available may 
pertain to several persons and may include some imaginary 
accounts. Nonetheless, some historical materials support 
various elements of Nāgārjuna’s biographies. Present 
scholarship indicates that Nāgārjuna could have lived as 
early as AD 50 and as late as AD 280. A common consensus 
gives his dates as AD 150–250.”3 
Similarly vague are many accounts of his whereabouts during his 
lifetime. Nevertheless, one hypothesis suggests that he had lived in South 
India. Some archaeological evidence supports this assumption.4
Nāgārjuna’s principal philosophical works which have remained 
available in Sanskrit are the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, the ‘fundamental’ 
or ‘root’ (mūla) ‘concise statements in verses’ (kārikā) on the ‘Middle 
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Way’ (Madhyamaka); and the Vigrahavyāvartanī, the ‘quarrel’ (vigraha) 
in terms of a ‘debate’ with the means of ‘averting’ (vyāvartana5) 
the opponent’s argument. This gives the literal English translation of 
Vigrahavyāvartanī as ‘She who is Averting Quarrel’. Erich Frauwallner 
translated it beautifully into German as “Die Streitabwehrerin”.6 Both 
works are critical analyses of views about the origin of existence, the 
means of knowledge, and the nature of reality. These two texts are highly 
praised as Nāgārjuna’s best works – as Frauwallner commented on the 
Vigrahavyāvartanī: “Es ist eines seiner besten Werke und zeigt ihn in seiner 
ganzen Eigenart, vor allem in seiner unbeirrbaren Folgerichtigkeit”.7
Consequently, this article focuses on Nāgārjuna’s discursive texts, 
which are available to us, with the emphasis on emptiness of all things, 
rather than on the legends and myths about his life, which will lead to 
a further examination of the concept of emptiness by the Mādhyamika 
school.
Mādhyamika’s View on Emptiness
According to Nāgārjuna, the whole world is characterized by being 
empty. At first glance, this seems quite a complex philosophical position. 
The idea is that things as we perceive them are ultimately nothing other 
than projections of our own mind through a process of conceptualization. 
Hence, things in the perceptual world do not possess any inherent 
characteristics. This implies that individual objects depend for their being 
on what they are to be taken as through other, external factors. Therefore, it 
is not the case that they possess any features on their own that make them 
what they are. All dharmas (‘things’) are being seen as śūnya (‘empty’). 
Hence, all things are empty of any inherent or intrinsic existence, and they 
solely depend on their causes and conditions (pratītyasamutpāda) – and 
that is what is called śūnyatā (‘emptiness’).8
Nāgārjuna describes this in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā in chapter 
XXIV in verse 18:
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“We declare that whatever is relational origination is 
śūnyatā. It is a provisional name (i.e., thought construction) for 
the mutuality (of being) and, indeed, it is the middle path.”9 
Nāgārjuna further strengthens his argument by nullifying the 
opposite in verse 19:
“Any factor of experience which does not participate in 
relational origination cannot exist. Therefore, any factor of 
experience not in the nature of śūnya cannot exist.”10 (ibid.)
To summarize this in my own words: Things as they appear to us do 
not possess any existence on their own. Therefore they are seen as empty, 
as unsubstantial, and it is this emptiness, which is their absolute truth. 
Nāgārjuna’s thought was in the same way expressed half a millennium 
later by Śāntideva in his Bodhicaryāvatāra. It is the ‘entry’ (avatāra) into 
the ‘practice’ (caryā) for ‘awakening’ (bodhi). Its popularity came about 
due to being on the one hand an inspirational poem and at the same time 
a profound teaching. In chapter IX, verse 2 in the Bodhicaryāvatāra 
Śāntideva exemplifies:
“This pair of truths we suppose:
the conventional truth and the ultimate truth.
Reality is not a field of intellection;
intellection is called conventional truth.”11
In other words: saṃvṛtisatya is the conventional or relative truth, 
i.e., as things appear to worldly beings. Things are seen by ordinary people 
and at the same time perceived as being real. Whereas paramārthasatya 
is the ultimate or absolute truth, i.e., the ultimate nature of appearing 
things, which declares saṃvṛtisatya as a perceiving illusion. Therefore, 
the conventional truth is deceiving, and from the perspective of the 
absolute truth seen as a pure illusion of ordinary people.
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One might understand this point better if Nāgārjuna’s view here 
is contrasted with that of Aristotle and the Theory of Essentialism.
the opposing Argument of Aristotle and the theory of essentialism
In contrast to Nāgārjuna, for Aristotle, individual objects possess 
some kind of ‘essence’ that makes them what they really are. This 
‘essence’ of an individual thing is peculiar to it and is not common to 
anything else, and in a sense it is identical with the thing itself. Aristotle 
calls this ‘essence’ the ‘what-it-is-to-be-that-thing’.12 “… [I]t is evident 
that each particular itself, and the essence, not according to accident are 
one and the same thing, and that to have a scientific knowledge, at any 
rate, of anything is to know scientifically the very nature or essence of 
that thing.”.13
The essence being one and the same thing with the particular thing, 
thus, the ‘what-it-is-to-be-that-thing’ X is just the thing that makes X an 
X rather than a Y. For example, to answer the question “What is it that 
is a ‘table’?”. It would not be enough to define it by material, i.e., “It is 
wood.” Neither to define it by form: “It is a study table where you can 
read books.” Nor does the material of this thing alone have no individual 
character nor does form alone tell us what this individual thing really is. 
Things are what they can be said to be. What exists is always ‘this here 
thing’, ‘this here study table’.14
This is similar to the theory of Essentialism. It is the philosophical 
viewpoint that for any specific entity there are a set kind of characteristics 
or properties, that any entity of that kind must possess. The members of 
a specific kind of entity may possess other characteristics that are neither 
needed to establish its membership nor exclude its membership. Essences 
cannot just reflect the ways of grouping objects; they must result in 
properties of the object. An essence characterizes a substance or a form; 
it is permanent, unalterable, eternal, and present in every possible way. In 
simple terms, essentialism is a generalization stating that certain properties 
possessed by a group (e.g. people, things, ideas) are universal, and not 
dependent on context.15 For example, the essential properties of a tiger are 
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those without which it is no longer a tiger, i.e. regardless of whether it is 
striped, or albino, or has lost a leg. Properties, such as stripes or number 
of legs, are considered inessential.16 
Nāgārjuna’s Response to Assumptions about ‘Essences’
In Chapter XV, verses 1 and 2 of his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā he 
tells us:
“The rise of self-nature [svabhāva] by relational and causal 
conditions is not justifiable. For, such a self-nature will have 
a character of being made or manipulated.”
“How is it possible for the self-nature to take on the 
character of being made? For, indeed, the self-nature refers 
to something which cannot be made and has no mutual 
correspondence with something else.”17 
For Nāgārjuna one cannot find anything that corresponds to the 
Aristotelian ‘what-it-is-to-be-that-thing’, because what it is to be anything 
cannot be found in that thing itself. What is to be an X for Nāgārjuna 
depends crucially, but not solely, on the conceptual apparatus of the perceiver 
and cognizer, such that the thing is perceived to be an X. It also depends 
on other external factors. Thus a table is a table only because it fits with 
a conceptual category of ‘being a table’ in someone’s mind. Ultimately 
speaking, the table is not what it appears at all, for when one breaks it 
down, no components remain that can be identified as ‘the table’. Even 
when the components, such as the table’s legs, the top of the table, and so 
on, are put together in a certain way, the form in which these components 
are put together itself does not constitute the essential feature of the table 
because they do not exist ‘inside’ the table, so to speak, and exist as a form 
in the mind of the perceiver. Thus the relation between the object and 
the perceiver or the subject is crucial. That does not imply the negation 
of the table as such, but the table is nothing more than an impermanent 
appearance relative to its causes and conditions.18
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According to Nāgārjuna, the opponent (in our case Aristotle), is 
confused about the negation. To negate an entity X, one must first suppose 
that X exists. It is exactly this particular point where Aristotle’s argument 
is entangled in difficulties. 
“… [F]or if x does exist, then it cannot truly be said of x 
that it is not existent. Therefore, it is the opponent’s position 
that is absurd…. Furthermore, the opponent cannot take 
the line that emptiness does not exist without abandoning 
the principle that negation is only of an existent, for the 
opponent wishes to negate the doctrine of emptiness, and 
yet he does not want to say that emptiness exists, either. … 
[T]he negation of a non-existent entity does not establish 
the non-existence of that entity, but simply makes its 
non-existence known …”.19
Nāgārjuna points this out through an example about the negation 
of a mirage in his Vigrahavyāvartanī, verse 66:
“If that perception were by its own nature, it would not be 
dependently originated. That perception, however, which 
comes into existence dependently is voidness indeed. 
If that perception of a mirage as water were by its own 
nature, it would not be dependently originated. Since, 
however, it comes into existence in dependence upon the 
mirage, the wrong sight and the distracted attention, it is 
dependently originated. And since it is dependently originated, 
it is indeed void by its own nature – as previously stated.”20 
In this way Nāgārjuna shows that an approach like that of Aristotle, 
is mistaken because it is based on the assumption that one can only 
negate something that is real – but a mirage is unreal. It can only exist 
dependently. 
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“… and to say that an entity x exists dependently is equivalent 
to the claim that it cannot be found within the totality of 
causes and conditions. According to fundamental Buddhist 
principles, this means that the mirage does not exist.”21 
Similarities Between Schopenhauer’s and Nāgārjuna’s Viewpoints
Arthur Schopenhauer was born in Danzig in 1788 and studied 
philosophy at the universities of Göttingen and Berlin. His main 
philosophical work was published in 1819 as Die Welt als Wille und 
Vorstellung (The World as Will and Representation).22
Schopenhauer picked up Immanuel Kant’s concept of the thing-
in-itself as an act of the self-positing subject. Whereby Kant maintained 
that the thing-in-itself, the correlative of the phenomenon, is unknowable; 
for Schopenhauer the correlative of the phenomenon is the Will. 
Schopenhauer arrived at this conviction by looking inwards within 
oneself. “For in inner consciousness or inwardly directed perception lies 
‘the single narrow door to the truth’.”. It is the Will that become idea or 
presentation. The whole world is nothing but objectified Will, Will as a 
presentation to consciousness.
Schopenhauer combined his enthusiasm for the Hindu philosophy 
of Maya with a great admiration for the Buddha. This Buddhist viewpoint 
can be found in Schopenhauer’s work if we relate it to Nāgārjuna’s insight 
that the relation between the object and the perceiver or the subject is 
crucial. For Nāgārjuna, an object such as a table is ‘empty of its inherent 
character’ precisely because there is no thing in the object itself that qualifies 
to be the object without being related to any other outside factors. 
Thus to be an object requires a subject, and this is also Schopenhauer’s 
point. Nāgārjuna’s view that objects are empty, however, should not be 
interpreted as saying that ultimately speaking there are no such things as 
tables, chairs or the like, because for a thing to be ‘empty of its inherent 
character’ does not mean that it does not exist. Tables and chairs do really 
exist in the world, but their ontological status is not an independent one. 
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For Schopenhauer as well, objects such as tables and chairs do not 
exist on their own. “The world of experience is the phenomenal world: 
it is object for a subject. And as such it is the world of our mental 
presentations (Vorstellungen).”23 They are projections or manifestations of 
the Will, and this is where Schopenhauer and Nāgārjuna agree. Another 
similar point is that for Schopenhauer and Nāgārjuna there is no duality 
between the things as they appear and the ultimate reality which they 
really are. Thus objective things and the Will or emptiness are essentially 
expressing one and the same thing. For Nāgārjuna this is because 
emptiness itself is nothing but the fact that all things are interdependent.24
In terms of Schopenhauer’s thinking, it does not make sense to 
say that individual objects are separate from the Will, because the whole 
metaphysical system relies on the idea that there is, essentially speaking, 
only one entity, namely the Will. So for Schopenhauer, the Will, being 
the only one entity there is, appears as many things as perceived by 
an individual subject because the latter is endowed with the Principle 
of Individuation, which enables the subject to perceive the world as it 
appears. “If … the world exists only as object for a subject, it is also true 
that the percipient subject is correlative with the object.”25 The world is 
one’s idea. This also corresponds to Nāgārjuna’s view that it is conceptual 
imputation that results in our perception of things as being manifold, 
as being separated one from another. For Schopenhauer matter and 
intelligence have been “… inseparable correlates, existing only for one 
another, and therefore only relatively … the two together constitute the world 
as idea …”.26 Hence, the world is one’s own idea, and as such a projection 
comprises both perceiver and perceived.
differences Between emptiness and the Will
Although the Will and emptiness are similar in several ways, 
there are clear differences. The Will is a blind driving force, which is 
manifested concretely through our conscious, individual will and bodily 
action. Emptiness, on the other hand, can’t be so described at all and has 
no individual characteristics whatsoever. In fact, this is consistent with 
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Nāgārjuna’s claim that emptiness itself is empty: śūnyatā is śūnyatā. 
Which means that emptiness itself is not different from any other 
individual object because emptiness also lacks any inherent characteristics. 
What this means is that emptiness itself is also a result of conceptual 
imputation. It is we, human beings, who use the term ‘emptiness’ to call 
it and to qualify it in such a way that it ‘lacks inherent characteristics’. 
This emptiness itself is empty. One cannot ascribe any substantive 
qualification or property to emptiness. This is in contrast to the Will, 
which for Schopenhauer has a number of its own characteristics, which 
it does not share with other objects. 
This is a key difference, and it stems from the two philosophers’ 
differences with regard to how their conceptions of ultimate reality come 
about. Nāgārjuna arrived at the conception of emptiness through analysis 
of the concept of a thing. For example, a thing has to have a boundary 
beyond which it is not that thing. It is inconceivable for a thing to have 
no limit at all, for that would mean no words can describe it. But if there 
is a limit then it is that very limit that defines the thing in question. And 
since the limit, or the boundary of a thing, cannot be one and the same 
as the thing itself, the thing is essentially dependent upon another thing, 
which it is not. 
“All things prevail for the one for whom this emptiness 
prevails. Nothing prevails for the one for whom 
emptiness does not prevail.” (own translation of verse 
70 of Vigrahavyāvartanī)27
This is not the same as Schopenhauer, who models the conception 
of the Will on bodily conscious acts. “… Schopenhauer does not wish to 
base his philosophy on a privileged and exceptional intuition of ultimate 
reality, but rather on our intuitive perception of our own volition.”28 
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Nāgārjuna’s and Schopenhauer’s Way of Salvation
According to Nāgārjuna, it is in the world that one transcends 
the world and thus transfigures it. There is not the slightest difference 
between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. Verses 19 and 20 in chapter XXV of the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā state:
“Saṃsāra (i.e., the empirical life-death cycle) is nothing 
essentially different from nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is nothing 
essentially different from saṃsāra. 
The limits (i.e., realm) of nirvāṇa are the limits of saṃsāra. 
Between the two, also, there is not the slightest difference 
whatsoever.”29 
The difference between nirvāṇa and saṃsāra is in our way of looking 
at them. Nirvāṇa is saṃsāra without appearance and disappearance, 
without ‘dependent origination’. As described in verse 9 in chapter XXV 
of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā:
“The status of the birth-death cycle is due to existential 
grasping (of the skandhas) and relational condition (of the 
being). That which is non-grasping and non-relational is 
taught as nirvāṇa.”30 
To reach nirvāṇa one first has to overcome one’s defilements. The 
method of Mādhyamika to overcome defilements is through holding to 
the impression of emptiness, which later on itself has to be discarded by 
realizing that the impression of existence is nothing at all. Ernst Steinkellner 
offers a splendid translation of this method by the Mādhyamika, described 
in the Bodhicaryāvatāra in chapter IX, verses 33 till 35:
“Wenn man sich der Tendenz zur Leerheit versichert, 
schwindet die Tendenz zum Sein, und später schwindet 
durch die Einübung der [Erkenntnis], dass nichts existiert, 
auch diese [Tendenz zur Leerheit].
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Wenn man auf kein Sein mehr stößt, von dem man annehmen 
könnte, dass es nicht existiere, wie könnte sich dann dem 
Geist ein anhaltsloses Nichtsein bieten?
Wenn sich dem Geist nicht Sein noch Nichtsein bieten, dann 
findet er, anhaltslos, die Ruhe, denn eine andere Möglichkeit 
gibt es nicht.”31 32
Our inclination towards existence has to be eliminated through 
the realization of emptiness. Then even the inclination towards emptiness 
will be eliminated through the realization that also emptiness itself has no 
substantial existence. Hence, the realization (die Vergegenwärtigung/das 
Innewerden) of emptiness is capable to break up the binary category of 
thinking and the dichotomizing category of speaking about ‘existence’ 
and ‘non-existence’.33
Schopenhauer describes two ways of escaping the ‘slavery of the 
Will’. Firstly, the way of aesthetic contemplation, which he describes 
as the way of art. In aesthetic contemplation one transcends the original 
subjection of knowledge to the Will, to desire. One becomes the pure 
will-less subject of knowledge, lost in fixed contemplation. In that state 
one is freed from the servitude of the Will. The mind enjoys a rest from 
being an instrument for the satisfaction of desire and adopts a purely 
objective and disinterested point of view. In summary: If the Will turns 
on itself and abolishes itself, nothing is left. This is probably one of the 
most striking similarities between Schopenhauer and the Mādhyamika’s 
approach to even overcome emptiness at the end through realizing the 
emptiness of emptiness (compare with Bodhicaryāvatāra, chapter IX, 
verses 33 till 35 above). Or as Nāgārjuna put it: śūnyatā is śūnyatā.
The second way is the path of asceticism, which Schopenhauer 
calls the way of salvation. One “… must disown his own nature by 
extinguishing at the source all sensual desire and gratification, by the 
voluntary acceptance of poverty, by the mortification of the body which 
is the visible objectivity of the will.”34 In contrast to the first option, this 
approach of Schopenhauer might be taken as an alternative to the Buddhist 
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After having portrayed the similarities between Nāgārjuna, Śāntideva 
and Schopenhauer, and contrasted their ideas with the standpoint of 
Aristotle, I hope I have contributed to the closer understanding of the concept 
of śūnyatā. Now, whether Nāgārjuna was referring with his expression 
‘the middle path’ to the teaching of the Buddha or whether he tried to 
give a definition of his own position (Tauscher, 2009: 96), has finally to 
be left open. At the end Nāgārjuna neither denies the world nor affirms it. 
This view could be seen as ‘the middle path’ – and therefore the name of 
his philosophy as Mādhyamika. I personally gained the impression that 
Nāgārjuna did not aim to give a definition of śūnyatā of his own. I say 
so because, basically speaking, Nāgārjuna elaborates on the Buddha’s 
teaching without adding any substantive ideas of his own. Knowing that 
this is a rather contentious point among Buddhist scholars, nevertheless, 
I think it is clear in any case that Nāgārjuna’s intention in his work is not 
to propound his own view, but to clarify and systematize the Buddha’s 
teaching so as to achieve the soteriological goal of Buddhism itself.
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